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With the increasing (although by no means uniquely modern) phenomenon of un-
attributable NSA cross-border violence, a purely inter-state-rights based approach to Article 
51 of the UN Charter is not (if ever indeed it was) sustainable. The jus ad bellum does, and 
should, reflect broader shifts in general international law. This article argues that (i) the ever 
increasing but nevertheless long-standing diversity of actors in modern international law is 
accommodated within a pluralistic conception of the UN Charter; (ii) the increasingly 
recognised shift in international law from ‘sovereignty as right’ to ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’ is contextually relevant in interpreting the right to use force in self-defence; 
and that (iii) together, these broader shifts in general international law, as reflected in the jus 
ad bellum, support and inform the legal basis of a victim state’s right to use defensive force in 
a foreign host state’s territory in response to un-attributable armed attacks by NSAs, both via 
the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine.        
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***** 
 
Is [the state] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then [it] is not omnipotent. Is [the 
state] able, but not willing? Then [it] is malevolent. Is [the state] both able and 
willing? Then whence cometh evil?
1
 
 
 
There has been much written on the evolution of the international legal order – from one 
which exclusively addresses and protects state interests to one which addresses non-state 
actors (NSAs)
2
 and balances (or increasingly prioritises) important human interests against 
state interests.
3
  The recurring themes of these contributions are the increasing pluralism of 
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actors and rights holders / obligation bearers in the international legal order
4
 and the ever 
brightening spotlight on human rights and human security (conceptualised in part in terms of 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’5).  Their focus, however, has tended to be in respect of the 
development of human rights law and international criminal justice.  Where these themes 
inform discussions on the jus ad bellum, they have done so principally in respect of 
humanitarian intervention and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P).6  But these shifts in 
international law also influence (and are influenced by) debates regarding the right to use 
force in self-defence.  For instance, to what extent does the UN Charter, and Articles 2(4) and 
51 in particular, accommodate the increasing plurality of actors in the international legal 
order?  And must individual rights to life and physical integrity – particularly in their positive 
conception (imposing an obligation on states to protect individuals within their jurisdiction) – 
give way to a third party state’s right to territorial integrity?  These are some of the questions 
at stake in jus ad bellum debates about a victim state’s7 right to use force in self-defence in 
response to un-attributable armed attacks by NSAs launched from a foreign host state’s8 
territory. 
With the increasing (although by no means uniquely modern) phenomenon of un-
attributable NSA cross-border violence, a purely inter-state-rights based approach to Article 
51 of the UN Charter is not (if ever indeed it was) sustainable. The jus ad bellum does, and 
should, reflect broader shifts in general international law. This article argues that (i) the ever 
increasing but nevertheless long-standing diversity of actors in modern international law is 
accommodated within a pluralistic conception of the UN Charter; (ii) the increasingly 
recognised shift in international law from ‘sovereignty as right’ to ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’ is contextually relevant in interpreting the right to use force in self-defence; 
and that (iii) together, a pluralistic conception of the UN Charter, and the ‘turn to 
responsibility’ in international law, support and inform the legal basis of a victim state’s right 
to use defensive force in a foreign host state’s territory in response to un-attributable armed 
attacks by NSAs.   
By way of introduction, this article will first give an account of a classical inter-state-
rights based approach to Article 51 of the UN Charter (and its interaction with Article 2(4)) 
and the difficulties that arise under such an approach (section I), before turning to the modern 
contexts of actor-pluralism in the international legal order (section II) and ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’ (section III) within which Articles 2(4) and 51 operate.  Informed by this 
international legal context, section IV will lay out alternative interpretive approaches to self-
defence, as an independent right (IV.ii) or a responsive right (IV.iii), each permitting the use 
                                                                                                                                                        
Journal of International Law 866.    
4
 See Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System; Continuity and Change in International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Paul Berman, The Globalisation of International Law (Ashgate, 
2005); Robert McCorquodale, ‘An Inclusive International Legal System’ (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 477; and Gunther Teubner, Global Law without a State (Dartmouth, 1997).  
5
 For an early account, see Francis M Deng (ed), Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa 
(Brookings Institution Press, 1996); Fracis M Deng, ‘Frontiers of Sovereignty: A Framework of Protection, 
Assistance, and Development for the Internally Displaced’ (1995) 8 Leiden Journal of International Law 249. 
6
 See, for example, Philip Alston and Euan Macdonald (eds), Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force 
(Oxford University Press, 2008); Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Use 
of Force: Building Legality?’ (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 191; Jennifer M Welsh, ‘From Right to 
Responsibility: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society’ (2002) 8 Global Governance 503; and 
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to 
Protect (2001). 
7
 ‘Victim state’ will be the term used throughout this article to describe the state in whose territory (and against 
whose inhabitants) a cross-border armed attack is launched by NSAs.     
8
 ‘Host state’ will be the term used throughout this article to describe the state from whose territory NSAs 
launch an armed attack, and in whose territory defensive force is used in response to the NSA armed attack.   
3 
 
of defensive force in a host state’s territory in response to un-attributable armed attacks by 
NSAs by way of the now familiar doctrine of ‘unwilling or unable.’9   
For present purposes, the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine is understood as the basis for 
a victim state’s use of defensive force against (and only against) NSAs operating from a host 
state’s territory, in response to un-attributable cross-border armed attacks by those NSAs, 
when the host state is unwilling or unable to prevent its territory from being used by NSAs to 
the detriment of the victim state’s security interests (manifested in the form of an armed 
attack by NSAs against that victim state and those subject to its jurisdiction
10
).  The doctrine 
responds to the requirement that a use of force in self-defence be ‘necessary’ as a matter of 
customary international law.
11
   
 
 I. A purely inter-state and responsive reading of the jus ad bellum  
 
The Article 2(4) UN Charter prohibition on inter-state force suggests a classical conception 
of international law in which states are the exclusive actors.  This is because the prohibition is 
directed at states, and prohibits force between states – and is, to that extent, ‘state-centric’, 
apparently leaving little room to accommodate a pluralistic approach to the international legal 
order or the actors that operate within it.  In its formulation of the prohibition on the use of 
force, Article 2(4) can also be read as articulating a rights-based conception of state 
sovereignty – in the form of a right to territorial integrity and political independence (read by 
some commentators as combining in a right to territorial inviolability
12
), protected by a broad 
prohibition.   
The possibility for a state to use force in self-defence in another state’s territory has 
generally been understood as a responsive measure.
13
  On this understanding of the UN 
Charter, there are two necessary elements of a right to use force in self-defence.  First, the 
state in whose territory defensive force is used must have been responsible for a prior breach 
of Article 2(4) – its right to territorial integrity or inviolability is breached responsively (in 
the sense that the defensive force used is a form of countermeasure).
14
  Secondly, there must 
have been an armed attack (which is the trigger for the right to use force in self-defence under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter).  And a purely inter-state-rights based reading of the 
prohibition on the use of force evidently coloured the responsive understanding of Article 51 
in the decades following adoption of the UN Charter.  If the UN Charter is understood in 
purely inter-state terms, such that it does not admit NSAs into the jus ad bellum narrative, 
these two necessary elements of lawful self-defence become entirely co-extensive.  The 
result, of course, is that where there is no prior breach of Article 2(4) by the state in whose 
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territory defensive force is used (in the very particular form of a wrongful ‘armed attack’ by 
that state), there is no right of self-defence.  While nothing in the language of the UN Charter 
limits ‘armed attack’ to attacks carried out by states,15 many commentators remain committed 
to such a reading of the interaction between Articles 2(4) and 51.
16
   
Such an account, however, fails to address an issue of great contemporary importance 
in international law:  how does the jus ad bellum respond to the realities of a world in which 
there are both states and NSAs – particularly when NSAs have the capacity to launch attacks 
rivalling that of states?  If the interaction between Articles 2(4) and 51 only contemplates 
state actors, such that the right to territorial integrity is qualified if and only if the state in 
whose  territory defensive force is used is the author of a particular type of Article 2(4) 
breach (in the form of an armed attack), then either (i) states cannot defend themselves and 
individuals subject to their jurisdiction against armed attacks by NSAs through force in a 
foreign host state’s territory without consent; or (ii) a host state’s failure to prevent its 
territory from being used as a base of NSA operations is grounds for attributing cross-border 
attacks by those NSAs to the host state. 
Neither of these options is satisfactory.  The suggestion that the UN Charter requires a 
state (as a matter of legal obligation) to sit idly by while persons subject to its jurisdiction are 
attacked from across a border by NSAs is wildly unrealistic – the UN Charter is not a Suicide 
Pact,
17
 and requiring such passivity is hardly consistent with the reading of the UN Charter as 
protecting the ‘sovereignty of peoples.’18  It is also inconsistent with a careful reading of the 
UN Charter travaux préparatoires, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s case law, and 
modern state practice.
19
  This article will further argue that such a reading of the UN Charter 
fails to reflect broader shifts in international law: in particular, the increasing actor-pluralism 
of the international legal order and conceptions of sovereignty as responsibility, each as 
explored below.  Such a reading of the UN Charter does, however, reflect the socio-legal 
context within which Articles 2(4) and 51 were interpreted in the decades following the 
conference in San Francisco.
20
  But interpretations that reflect a particular legal context need 
to evolve with that context, and so it is with the UN Charter.
21
 
The second approach tries to have it both ways – it acknowledges and addresses the 
danger posed by NSAs, while remaining committed to an inter-state-rights based approach to 
the interaction between Articles 2(4) and 51.  The legal device relied on to achieve this is to 
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argue that the rules of attribution have shifted in favour of a standard of complicity, at least in 
the terrorism or NSA use of force context.
22
 The result is rather elegant in legal terms: the 
armed attack launched by NSAs from a host state’s territory is attributable thereto, and the 
use of defensive force in that state’s territory by the victim state is therefore responsive to an 
armed attack committed by the very state whose territorial integrity is breached for defensive 
purposes. This approach remains committed to an inter-state reading of Article 2(4) and a 
responsive approach to Article 51, in that NSA conduct is not addressed on its own terms – 
the mechanism of attribution effectively ‘disappears’ NSAs from the legal analysis of the 
interaction between Articles 2(4) and 51.  Such an argument, however, does unnecessary 
violence to both the rules of attribution as articulated by the International Law Commission 
(ILC),
23
 and the relationship between law and fact,
24
 all in the name of legal coherence with 
an inter-state-rights based approach to the jus ad bellum that no longer reflects the nature of 
the international legal system within which the UN Charter operates (as explored in sections 
II and III below).  Such an approach also fails to address the circumstances in which a state is 
willing but not able to prevent its territory from being used as a base of NSA activities, with 
diligent efforts limited by capacity which cannot be characterised as complicity.      
 
II. Actor-pluralism in the UN Charter 
 
While the UN Charter was negotiated in the immediate aftermath of a global inter-state 
conflict, it nevertheless can (and does) accommodate the increasing diversity of actors in the 
evolving international legal order.  Indeed, in the 21st century, both the General Assembly 
and the Security Council have moved past addressing threats to international peace and 
security as though states are the exclusive actors – attending to threats emanating from NSAs 
on their own terms.  This section will therefore argue that the UN Charter is no longer, if ever 
it strictly was, exclusively state-centric.      
 
i. The broader ‘actor-pluralism’ of the UN Charter collective security context  
  
Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides the window through which a collective security 
framework designed in the aftermath of a global inter-state conflict might address NSA 
threats directly.  It is true that the Security Council’s broad powers in regard to ‘any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ under Article 39 and Chapter VII were 
                                                 
22
 See Tams (n 20).  
23
 See Article 8, Commentary to Part Two, Chapter I, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission on the work 
of its fifty-third session, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001) 31 (‘ILC Articles on State Responsibility’).  In particular, 
complicity as a basis of attribution (at least in the state responsibility context) has been rejected expressly by the 
ICJ in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (judgment) [2007] ICJ Reports 43, para 432, and implicitly by the Court 
long before that in  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Islamic 
Republic of Iran) (‘Tehran Hostages’) (judgment) [1980] ICJ Reports 3.  The Court noted in Tehran Hostages 
that the failure of the Iranian Government to take any steps to prevent the seizure of and to protect the US 
Embassy was due to more than mere negligence or lack of appropriate means (para 63).  The failure to act 
contained a measure of advertence and deliberateness, particularly given evidence that Iran had protected the US 
Embassy in the past (paras 14 and 64) and that Ayatollah Khomeini had compelled the revolutionaries to hand 
over other hostages (para 21) or to leave other seized Embassies (para 65).  In the circumstances, Iran’s conduct 
could certainly have been characterised as complicity, but the Court only held that the hostage situation was 
attributable to Iran when Khomeini had adopted the conduct and set conditions for its perpetuation, implicitly 
rejecting complicity as a basis of attribution.     
24
 See Trapp (n 19) 61. For further discussion, see James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014) §5.4.2.   
6 
 
originally conceptualised in keeping with the centrality of the state in international relations – 
threats were expected to emanate from states, even if it was understood that they might result 
from a state’s relationship with NSAs.  For instance, proposals in San Francisco regarding the 
scope of Chapter VII powers, while highlighting that NSAs might pose a threat insofar as 
they are supported or tolerated by states,
25
 and thereby recognising that states are not the only 
actors capable of threatening international peace and security, nevertheless viewed NSAs as 
derivative threats – capable of acting on the international stage in virtue of the action or 
inaction of states.  Similarly, the ‘Definition of Aggression’ adopted by the UN General 
Assembly
26
 for the purposes of guiding the Security Council in the exercise of its Chapter VII 
powers
27
 considers NSAs as capable of being a threat to international peace and security (i.e., 
capable of engaging in acts of aggression) insofar as their conduct is attributable to a state.
28
  
Indeed, in the decades following the adoption of the ‘Definition of Aggression,’ the Security 
Council principally addressed NSA threats to international peace and security through the 
prism of state obligations to prevent their activities, eliminate their weapons supplies and 
exercise control over their territories.
29
       
All this said, Chapter VII, along with the rest of the UN Charter, was drafted with a 
view to dynamic application.
30
 A number of states, even while expressing concern over the 
breadth of the Security Council’s powers and the balance of power between its permanent 
members and the General Assembly, accepted the need for flexibility in defining the scope of 
those powers to ensure the future relevance of the collective security system.
31
  The 
Czechoslovakian (as it then was) government expressed this approach to Security Council 
powers well: ‘the new Organization should possess the widest powers and should retain 
sufficient flexibility to be capable of organic growth and of mastering any situation that may 
arise.’32   
Much has been written on the evolution of the Security Council’s use of its Chapter 
VII powers.
33
  In one aspect, and broadly speaking, that evolution has tracked the 
increasingly independent operation of NSAs and their impact on international peace and 
security.  The Council today, in its exercise of Chapter VII powers, is not unduly restrained 
by the Westphalian view of the international legal order which may have prevailed in 1945.  
In the 21st century, the collective security apparatus of Chapter VII more than accommodates 
the multiplicity of actors within the international legal system – and does so whether or not 
NSA capacity is tied to their relationship with one or more states.  On numerous occasions, 
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the Council has directly addressed the activities of armed groups, terrorist organisations, and 
individual terrorists –including without tying the threat posed by such NSAs to the action or 
inaction of a state.
34
     
 
ii. The limited ‘state-centricity’ of the jus ad bellum provisions of the UN Charter  
 
While Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter have long been read to reflect an international 
legal order in which states are the principal (even exclusive) actors, such a legal order no 
longer exists.  Interpretations of the UN Charter prohibition on the use of force and right to 
use force in self-defence must account for subsequent agreement between the parties and 
subsequent practice,
35
 and must be responsive to the evolving nature of threats to 
international peace and security and the international legal system generally.
36
  Indeed, the 
subsequent agreement and practice of states will evidently inform and reflect this evolution, 
including the modern context of actor-pluralism generally and the Security Council’s 
recognition of NSAs as a threat to international peace and security specifically.      
 
(a) Article 51 right to use force in self-defence  
 
Article 51 of the UN Charter does not exclude NSAs, even if it very evidently does not 
address them expressly.  Nothing in the language of Article 51 suggests that uses of force that 
rise to the level of ‘armed attack’ can only be carried out by states, and the negotiating history 
of the UN Charter does not support interpreting ‘armed attack’ as ‘armed attack by a state.’37  
Indeed, an approach to a state’s right of defence which admits and addresses the risk posed 
by NSAs is significantly more in keeping with pre-Charter practice than one which requires 
the attributability of NSA conduct or excludes NSAs entirely. In the pre- Charter era (or at 
least pre-Kellogg Briand Pact), there was of course no legal reason for states to invoke self-
defence as a justification for a use of force in another state’s territory (because such force was 
not prohibited).  Nevertheless, in the context of otherwise peaceful relations, states felt 
compelled to justify incursions into other states’ territories in response to cross-border attacks 
by NSAs, if not in the legal sense, then certainly in a diplomatic sense, ‘to avoid their conduct 
being characterised as “crude expansionism.”’38   
With the increase in NSA insurgencies and cross-border terrorism in the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries, it is clear that this earlier appreciation of the role NSAs might play in 
threatening international peace and security, to which a response would be necessary, has re-
emerged.  In the last 20 years, states have not infrequently invoked the right to use force in 
self-defence in response to cross-border armed attacks by NSAs, many such invocations 
broadly supported by the international community.
39
  While there is no doubt that in the 
decades following the adoption of the UN Charter, the interpretation of Article 51 was 
somewhat straight-jacketed by a Westphalian state-centric approach to the international legal 
                                                 
34
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order, state practice (in responding with defensive force to armed attacks by NSAs) reflects 
the actor-pluralism of the international legal order that prevails today.
40
              
 
(b) Article 2(4) prohibition on the use for force  
 
The prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) is directed at states, and prohibits force 
between states: to that extent it is ‘state-centric’. It does not, on its face, accommodate the 
pluralism of actors operating within the international legal system.  In particular, Article 2(4) 
does not directly prohibit the use of force by NSAs, nor does it speak to uses of force by 
states against NSAs.  To say so, however, need not be by way of signalling the ‘death’ of 
Article 2(4),
41
 but is merely to acknowledge that the UN Charter is a treaty addressing itself 
to the conduct of ‘international relations’,42 and that the prohibition was framed in the 
aftermath of a global inter-state conflict.  While Thomas Franck’s concern, famously 
expressed in 1970, over the demise of Article 2(4) in light of the rise of state support for 
foreign NSA insurgencies
43
 may well have underestimated the capacity for treaty based law 
to be read in light of an increasingly pluralistic world order, he is not alone in focusing on the 
restrictions on self-defence imposed by a purely inter-state reading of the interaction between 
Articles 2(4) and 51.  Such a reading is commonly (although, as argued in section I above, 
should not be) the basis for arguments regarding attributability as a sine qua non for the use 
of defensive force in foreign territory in response to armed attacks by NSAs.
44
   
This particular ‘state-centricity’ of the UN Charter prohibition on the use of force, 
however, is not the whole story.  States commenting on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were 
already looking beyond the WWII model of invading national armies towards a more 
nuanced approach to the different ways in which states might affect international peace and 
security. In particular, several states called attention to the possibility of ‘[state] support to 
armed bands formed in [its] territory which have invaded the territory of another state, or 
refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its own territory all the 
measures in its power to deprive these bands of all assistance or protection.’45      
It is therefore not surprising that – as a strict matter of treaty interpretation – Article 
2(4) does not ignore the possibility that states might use force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of other states through NSAs.  Indeed, this is the way in which 
Article 2(4) has been interpreted by the UN General Assembly.  In its Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by consensus, the 
General Assembly proclaimed that:    
 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, 
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
46
 
                                                 
40
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41
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This duty was one of several enumerated as incorporated in the broad prohibition on the use 
of force set out in Article 2(4).  Of interest, the UN Declaration on Friendly Relations 
recognised that both action (organising, instigating, assisting or participating in the use of 
force by NSAs) and inaction (host state acquiescence in, or deliberate failure to prevent, NSA 
cross-border uses of force) can breach the prohibition on the use of force in international 
relations.  In so doing, the General Assembly highlighted that the UN Charter should not be 
read as adopting a purely inter-state approach to the jus ad bellum.  Rather, in at least this one 
aspect, Article 2(4) addresses a plurality of actors, in particular NSAs that might engage in 
‘acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State.’   
While Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is not so pluralistic in its approach as to directly 
prohibit NSAs from using force, it does allow for piercing the statehood veil, looking through 
to the relationship between states and NSAs (whether one of active support or passive 
complicity), and recognises that NSA violence can affect international peace and security.  In 
so doing, it reinforces the centrality of the state in international law (by viewing the activities 
of NSAs through the prism of their relationship with states), while embracing conceptions of 
sovereignty that emphasise responsibility (in affirming a state’s responsibility to exercise 
control throughout its territory), as discussed further in section III below. 
 
III. The ‘turn to responsibility’  
 
Is [the state] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then [it] is not omnipotent. Is [it] able, but 
not willing? Then [it] is malevolent.
47
 
 
The 19th century positivist notion of sovereignty as ‘exclusive authority over discrete parcels 
of territory’48 was understood principally in terms of legal competence or right.49  ‘Authority’ 
in this sense was actualisable at the state’s discretion – rather than a factual account of the 
control or ‘authority’ a state actually exercised over its territory.  Given that sovereignty was 
framed in terms of exclusive rights coupled with broad discretion, it acted as a cloak, 
obscuring from international scrutiny whether (and how) authority was exercised within its 
folds.  For all intents and purposes, a sovereign state was omnipotent – at least presumptively 
so in the sense that it was impermissible to peek beneath the cloak of formal sovereign 
equality and question a state’s capacity to exercise its exclusive authority (except in the 
context of title to territory).  Nor would much have hung on the answer, had such enquiries 
been entertained: international law in the 19th Century had very little to say about the manner 
in which states ought to exercise their sovereignty or exclusive territorial authority.                   
Such an account of sovereignty very evidently did not survive into the 20th Century, 
as it is incompatible with an increasingly inter-dependent and globalised international legal 
order (with its cross-border flow of goods and people, making national borders permeable – 
both in fact and in some cases in law), particularly one which legally protects human security 
and dignity.
50
  These developments do not of course signal the end of a system of 
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 Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the International System and the 
Challenge to International Law’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 9.    
49
 See Alex Mills, ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law’ (2014) 84 British Yearbook of International 
Law 187.   
50
 See Louis Henkin, ‘The Mythology of Sovereignty’ (1992) Proceedings of the Annual Conference of 
Canadian Council on International Law; ‘Away with the ‘S’ Word!’, March-May 1993 ASIL Newsletter; 
10 
 
international law based on sovereign territorial units
51
 and the birth of John Lennon’s 
‘Imagine[d]’ world.52  But they have shifted the modern narrative of sovereignty, which is 
now as much about responsibilities as it is it about rights, and concerns itself with questions 
of whether and how exclusive territorial authority is exercised in the interests of the people 
which it serves.
53
   
An account of sovereignty that speaks to both rights and associated responsibilities 
has long been accepted in the human rights context.   In the jus ad bellum context, a rights-
based conception of sovereignty has been more enduring – but not without caveat.  For 
instance, the Declaration on Friendly Relations, in defining ‘sovereign equality,’ stresses both 
the rights inherent in full sovereignty and the duty to comply with international obligations.
54
 
And there has been a serious movement to incorporate the ‘turn to responsibility’ into the jus 
ad bellum narrative in at least one aspect – through the General Assembly’s endorsement of 
the R2P concept.
55
 While the R2P doctrine is widely understood to be political, exercisable 
only through the collective security apparatus of the UN, and is tied very closely to the 
developments in conceptions of sovereignty that flow from the human rights framework, it is 
nevertheless an example of broader shifts in international law reflected in a particular Charter 
context.  This article argues that there are features of this ‘turn to responsibility’ that are also 
relevant in the broader jus ad bellum context, most particularly as regard the right to use force 
in self-defence.  For present purposes, there are three elements of this ‘turn to responsibility’ 
in international law, each as explored below, which form part of the modern legal landscape 
within which the UN Charter operates and which informs state practice.   
 
i. Responsibility to prevent internal harm   
 
The conception of sovereignty articulated in the now famous Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),
56
 from 2001, is closely tied to 
UN membership.  In particular, the Commission viewed ratification of the UN Charter not as 
a transfer of sovereignty from a state to an international organisation, but rather as requiring a 
re-characterisation of sovereignty, from sovereignty as control to ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’ – in fulfilment of the UN mission to promote the interests and welfare of 
people within Member States (‘We the peoples of the United Nations’).57 
This re-characterisation of sovereignty draws on modern human rights law (as an 
articulation of that UN mission), which pairs rights (protected by negative obligations 
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54
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imposed on states) with correlative positive duties. States not only have an obligation to 
respect rights, but to ensure respect for those rights.  As regards the right to life and physical 
integrity, embodied in all international and regional human rights instrument, individuals are 
entitled to expect that the state that exercises jurisdiction over them will not be the source of 
any existential threat, but equally that the state of jurisdiction will do everything within its 
capacity to protect them from any such existential threat, whatever its source.
58 
 This is a 
feature of the territorial state’s ‘responsibility to protect’59 – by which it is bound to ensure 
respect for the right to life of those threatened by attack, while respecting the right to life of 
others (it being understood that it is not a breach to take the life of X, if X is mortally 
threatening the life of Y, and lethal force is necessary for the purposes of protecting Y).
60
     
The legal obligation (responsibility) to prevent internal harm is connected to the jus ad 
bellum by ICISS in the following manner: ‘the Charter’s strong bias against military 
intervention is not to be regarded as absolute when decisive action is required on human 
protection grounds.’61  While ICISS was contemplating force in the territory of the state that 
had failed to meet the responsibilities of human protection inherent in sovereignty, the idea 
that military force may be required in territory outside the state seeking to meet those same 
responsibilities is part of the modern legal landscape, as clearly set out in the ICJ’s Wall 
advisory opinion: 
 
The fact remains that Israel has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of 
violence against its civilian population. It has the right, and indeed the duty, to respond 
in order to protect the life of its citizens.  The measures taken are bound nonetheless to 
remain in conformity with applicable international law.
62
   
 
While the Wall opinion was very evidently not addressing an inter-state context in which 
Article 2(4) is applicable, recognition of the obligation to protect those subject to Israel’s 
jurisdiction against armed attacks by NSAs, as a feature of the ‘turn to responsibility’ within 
the human rights framework, also forms part of the legal context within which the jus ad 
bellum provisions of the UN Charter operate.         
                                                 
58
 See, for example, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights [2002] IACmHR, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc 5 rev. 
1 corr., para 87; Osman v United Kingdom [1998] ECtHR (Grand Chamber), application no. 23452/94, paras 
115-6; UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 6 (1982), para 3; Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights (2007, OSCE) 100-1. 
59
 Report of the ICISS (n 6), para 2.22.    
60
 See, for example, IACHR (n 58), para 87; OSCE (n 58) 107; Article 2(2)(a) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
61
 Report of the ICISS (n 6), para 2.27.   
62
 Wall (n 15) para 141.  Such an account is consistent with very early conceptions of self-defence – which was 
understood not only as a right, but as a duty – and one owed to persons subject to the state’s jurisdiction.  See 
Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Little Brown and Co., 6th edn 1857), 86.  See also Emer de 
Vattel, The Law of Nations (Richard Kapossy and Béla Whatmore (eds), Liberty Fund, 2008 (1758)), Book III, 
Section III, §35, 487, in which he characterises self-defence as ‘not only the right but the duty of a nation, and 
one of her most sacred duties’.  
12 
 
 
ii. Responsibility to prevent external harm  
 
While the ‘turn to responsibility’ in sovereignty terms is strongly tied to international human 
rights law (as discussed above), there have long been accounts of sovereignty that balanced 
the rights associated therewith against responsibilities to those beyond the state’s territorial 
borders.  In his famous 1928 Island of Palmas arbitral judgment, Max Huber had this to say 
on the matter:         
 
Territorial sovereignty, as has already been said, involves the exclusive right to display 
the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect 
within the territory the rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and 
inviolability in peace and in war, together with the rights which each State may claim 
for its nationals in foreign territory. Without manifesting its territorial sovereignty in a 
manner corresponding to circumstances, the State cannot fulfil this duty. Territorial 
sovereignty cannot limit itself to its negative side, i.e. to excluding the activities of other 
States; for it serves to divide between nations the space upon which human activities 
are employed, in order to assure them at all points the minimum of protection of which 
international law is the guardian.
63
 
 
Huber’s account focused on two aspects of state sovereignty – on the one hand, the role it 
plays in facilitating mutual co-existence,
64
 and, on the other, a conception of state sovereignty 
which serves human interests and activities.   
In regard to the first aspect, Huber’s conception of sovereignty as entailing a duty to 
protect the rights of other states is perhaps truer today than when articulated over eighty years 
ago.  States have long had a responsibility to prevent their territory from being used as a base 
of NSA violence against other states,
65
 and that responsibility has emerged as central to the 
international legal order in the post-9/11 world through Security Council resolutions
66
 and 
treaty practice.  For instance, there are a dozen multi-lateral terrorism suppression 
conventions, widely ratified, which oblige states to prevent trans-national terrorism from 
within their territories.
67
  While the obligation to act is territorially limited, it also prioritises 
international co-operation.
68
  Prevention efforts are thereby tied to a particular state’s territory 
(over which the territorial state will have ‘exclusive authority’69), but the co-operative feature 
of the obligation recognises that the trans-national nature of terrorist conduct poses a 
challenge for a legal system committed to geographically limited authority.   
The other aspect of Huber’s conception of state sovereignty, which suggests that 
sovereignty serves the interests (and activities) of those subject to it, is also increasingly part 
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of the modern discourse in international law. As Kofi Annan has stated: ‘[w]hen we read the 
Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human 
beings, not to protect those who abuse them.’70  In one aspect of the jus ad bellum – that 
regarding the contested right to humanitarian intervention – Annan is understood to mean that 
a state’s sovereignty (and concomitant right to territorial integrity) should not, for its own 
sake, shield a state so as to provide it with the (legal and physical) space within which to 
violate individual rights to life and physical integrity.  Given the devastating trans-national 
capabilities of groups of NSAs, and the ‘turn to responsibility’ both within and beyond a 
state’s territorial borders, the same should be said of the jus ad bellum self-defence context.  
Which is to say that a state’s territorial integrity should not act, for its own sake, to shield 
NSAs so as to provide them with the (legal and physical) space within which to violate 
individual rights to life and physical integrity, even if those threatened are across a border.
71
  
Very naturally, as is the case in regard to the conception of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ in 
the context of R2P, the territorial (and host) state has primary responsibility to ensure that its 
territory is not a base from which the rights of individuals (across a border) are attacked.  It is 
for these reasons, as discussed further below, that a use of force in self-defence in the host 
state’s territory is a measure of last resort.    
 
iii. Capacity      
 
The modern narrative of sovereignty discussed above, which is as much about responsibilities 
as it is it about rights, concerns itself with questions of whether and how exclusive territorial 
authority is exercised.  These concerns, as they pertain to the responsibility to prevent both 
internal and external harm, are not only a question of fact.  They are also a question of legal 
obligation.  States are under an obligation to both develop relevant capacity, and to use 
developed capacity to prevent harm within and across their borders.
72
 Both obligations are 
obligations of conduct
73
 – which is to say they are subject to a due diligence standard.          
An account of sovereignty that requires an evaluation of state capacity should, of 
course, account for the variable resources of states.  While it is not true that some states are 
more sovereign than others, it is certainly true that some states are better able to meet the 
responsibilities of sovereignty than others.  Owada therefore quite rightly argues that 
conceptualising sovereignty in terms of responsibility ‘places the emphasis on capacity 
building […] and collaboration.’74  As regards at least the capacity to prevent trans-national 
terrorism by NSAs, and following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the broader UN apparatus has 
engaged in a ‘capacity building blitz’ the likes of which the international community has not 
before seen.
75
  States are being afforded every opportunity to develop their counter-terrorism 
capacities, with a view to assisting states in preventing their territories from being used as 
bases of trans-national terrorism.
76
      
This said, most of the UN capacity building aid relates to developing an institutional 
capacity to prevent international terrorism.  States with limited human and financial resources 
and trouble maintaining control over parts of their territory (whether because of its distance 
from central government or its inhospitable terrain) will still have difficulty in putting 
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institutional capacity to effective use in preventing NSAs from using their territories as a base 
of activities.  The High Level Panel Report noted in particular that ‘[b]ecause United 
Nations-facilitated assistance is limited to technical support, states seeking operational 
support for counter-terrorism activities have no alternative but to seek bilateral assistance.’77   
 
iv. The ‘turn to responsibility’ and ‘unwilling or unable’        
 
The ‘turn to responsibility’ in international law, and its implications for conceptions of 
sovereignty as set out above, dovetails precisely with the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine as 
applied in both the R2P and self-defence contexts (the latter of which is explored further in 
section IV below).  In particular, ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ articulates a version of 
sovereignty which incorporates a host state’s obligation to prevent assaults against human life 
and dignity perpetrated on (section III.i above) and from (section III.ii above) its territory.  In 
so doing, it of course contemplates the possibility that states will fail to live up to their 
sovereign responsibilities, whether because of complicity with the NSAs perpetrating such 
assaults, or a lack of capacity (and failure or refusal to ‘seek bilateral assistance’) to address 
NSA activities.
78
 
In response to such failures, the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine permits targeted 
responses to protect human life, but does so on different terms in the R2P context (requiring 
the Security Council to act on behalf of the international community under Article 25 of the 
UN Charter
79
) than it does in the self-defence context (in which a unilateral response is 
permissible).  This is principally because, in the self-defence context, the obligation to protect 
life and physical integrity is owed directly by the victim state to those within its jurisdiction 
(rather than by the international community, thereby implicating the Security Council’s 
responsibility to act on its behalf).
80
  
As discussed further below, the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine in the self-defence 
context effectively incorporates the three features of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ – it 
provides legal cover (if necessary) when the victim state meets its human rights obligations to 
those subject to its jurisdiction (protecting them against existential threats emanating from 
NSAs operating from a host state’s territory), and responds to the host state’s failure to meet 
its own sovereign responsibilities (through its breach of the obligation to prevent external 
harm), based on an evaluation of that state’s capacity to so prevent and any opportunities for 
co-operative efforts in this regard.    
 
IV. Self-defence in the context of actor-pluralism and the ‘turn to responsibility’  
 
The object and purpose of the United Nations Charter was not merely to respond to threats to 
international peace and security as those were understood in the immediate aftermath of a 
global inter-state conflict, but to establish the framework through which peace and security 
could be maintained into the future – whatever form threats thereto might take.  Such an 
object and purpose clearly requires adaptability. Indeed, a ‘living tree’ approach to the UN 
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Charter, which makes of it a flexible instrument capable of addressing new challenges and 
adapting to the changing nature of the international legal order within which it operates, was 
called for in its earliest drafting stages.  President Roosevelt expressed the need to ensure the 
dynamism of the UN Charter thusly: ‘[l]ike the Constitution of the United States itself, the 
Charter of the United Nations must not be static and inflexible, but must be adaptable to the 
changing conditions of progress – social, economic, and political – all over the world.’81  
Similarly, John Foster Dulles, in an address to the San Francisco Conference, shared his 
belief that ‘future generations will thank us for what we do in adopting simple phrases and 
allowing them to evolve as the state of the world, and the factual interdependence of the 
world, makes it necessary and appropriate that [they] should evolve.’82 
Consistently with the view of those participating in the San Francisco conference on 
behalf of the US, academic commentators have long viewed the UN Charter as a 
constitutional treaty, which calls for an evolutionary interpretation in order that it continues to 
fulfil its object and purpose in a changing world.
83
  The ICJ has similarly applied an 
evolutionary approach to the UN Charter’s predecessor, holding that ‘an international 
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system 
prevailing at the time of the interpretation,’84 and applied an interpretive approach which 
‘make[s] allowance for, among other things, developments in international law’ in respect of 
treaties of ‘continuing duration’ (of which the UN Charter must surely be first in the class).85         
This ‘evolutionary interpretive approach’ to the UN Charter is herein adopted, and 
this article argues that President Roosevelt’s exhortation is particularly relevant in the self-
defence context.  In adopting an evolutionary interpretation of the jus ad bellum provisions of 
the UN Charter, there are two possible approaches to Article 51: either the right to use force 
in self-defence under Article 51 continues to be understood as a responsive right (not unlike a 
countermeasure, as discussed in section I above), permitting an otherwise prohibited use of 
force in the host state’s territory in response to its prior breach of Article 2(4); or the right to 
use force in self-defence is understood as an inherent and independent (rather than 
responsive) right – operating on its own terms and in some respects independently from 
Article 2(4).  In either case, the modern legal context of actor-pluralism and the ‘turn to 
responsibility’ within which the UN Charter operates informs the interpretation of Article 51 
via the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine.  This section will first set out the case for the 
‘independent’ vs ‘responsive’ approaches to Article 51 generally, before exploring each as 
interpreted in light of the modern international legal context within which the UN Charter 
operates.            
  
i. Independent or responsive?  
 
The history of self-defence as a legal justification for a use of force in foreign territory 
leading up to adoption of the UN Charter suggests that self-defence was understood as an 
independent right, inherent in state sovereignty.  The first broad prohibition on the use of 
force, as set out in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, made no mention of the right to use force in 
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self-defence.  Textually, the prohibition of force and the right of self-defence (which was 
understood to survive ratification) existed independently.  Indeed, the US note in respect of 
the draft Pact, which invited no objection from the fourteen states to which it was 
disseminated,
86
 read in relevant part that nothing in the draft anti-war treaty ‘which restricts 
or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state 
and is implicit in every treaty.’87  It is of interest to note that such an approach to self-
defence, which views the right as inherent in sovereignty, rather than responsive to prior 
wrongdoing, is consistent with the very earliest writing on the subject.  Grotius considered 
that the ‘right of self-defence […] arises directly and immediately from the care of our own 
preservation, which nature recommends to everyone, and not from the injustice or crime of 
the aggressor’.88  While clearly the modern right of self-defence is to be distinguished from 
its natural law foundations of a right to self-preservation,
89
 the point nevertheless remains 
relevant – the right of defence was perceived from the perspective of the victim state, not that 
of the aggressor.  Such an account does not require a responsive relationship between 
prohibited force and exception.  Similarly, in its first iteration in the UN Charter travaux 
preparatoires, Article 51 was framed in terms of regional and collective protection
90
 – the 
view point from which the right of defence was perceived was, therefore, again that of the 
victim state (and regional security), not the state in whose territory defensive force was used.   
Nevertheless, long standing academic opinion approaches Article 51 as a responsive 
right, in the sense that the right of self-defence can only be exercised against a state in 
response to that state’s prior breach of Article 2(4).91  As argued in section I above, this 
approach was informed by a purely inter-state-rights based reading of Article 2(4): given that 
the Charter narrative did not expressly admit of NSAs, and the rights of sovereignty (in 
particular to territorial integrity) were not yet conceptualised as associated with 
responsibilities, the only prior breach of 2(4) that could trigger Article 51 rights would be an 
‘armed attack’ by the state in whose territory defensive force was used.      
This was also the ILC’s initial approach to self-defence as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness – it is the approach Ago took in his Eight Report,92 and Crawford did not 
challenge the responsive relationship between Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter in his 
Second Report.
93
  In Ago’s draft of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, adopted on first 
reading, self-defence was a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in respect of (and only in 
respect of) a breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  Of particular relevance for present 
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purposes, Ago regarded self-defence as a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of an 
Article 2(4) breach precisely because the state against which defensive force was used had 
committed a specific type of internationally wrongful act:  ‘armed aggression, the use of 
force in an attack against the State in question.’94  
Ago’s Eight Report therefore characterised the wrongfulness preclusion of self-
defence as deriving from the responsive nature of the breach (as is the case for 
countermeasures), to be distinguished from a circumstance by way of which the breach of 
innocent third party rights might be justified or excused in the interests of protecting human 
life or other essential interests (as is the case in respect of necessity or distress).
95
  In framing 
self-defence as a responsive right in the context of state responsibility, Ago did not rely on 
the travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter or state practice, but rather on the understanding 
of the ‘most highly qualified publicists’96– which understanding was of course framed within 
the context of a state-centric international legal order that recognised the rights (and not 
responsibilities) inherent in sovereignty.   
Crawford, on the other hand, did not consider that the relationship between Articles 
2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter is a matter for the secondary rules.  Instead, he accepted the 
view put forward by a number of states in the Sixth Committee
97
 that: 
 
A State exercising its inherent right of self-defence as referred to in Article 51 of the 
Charter is not, even potentially, in breach of Article 2, paragraph 4, and if the only 
effect of self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness is so to provide, then 
it should be deleted [...].
98
   
 
As a result, self-defence in the ILC Articles as adopted on second reading only precludes the 
wrongfulness of breaches of other (non-Article 2(4)) international obligations, for instance 
treaties of amity,
99
 which might be occasioned by a use of force in self-defence.  Crawford 
nevertheless discussed the UN Charter framework in his Second Report, and his approach to 
Article 2(4) does make it rather surprising that he accepted uncritically the responsive nature 
of the relationship between Articles 2(4) and 51 – such that self-defence can only be 
employed in an Article 2(4) breaching state’s territory.  If self-defence is not (‘even 
potentially’) in breach of Article 2(4), then the prohibition must be read as incorporating the 
exception within its terms: it is therefore prohibited to use non-defensive force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other matter inconsistent 
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with the Purposes of the UN Charter.  If defensive force is carved out of the Article 2(4) 
prohibition entirely, it is not clear why a prior breach of Article 2(4) by the state in whose 
territory defensive force is used is considered a necessary pre-condition.         
All this said, it can credibly be argued that a responsive relationship between Articles 
2(4) and 51 is a matter of logical implication, and there is certainly something compelling in 
the view that the UN Charter is a complete system, setting out prohibitions with limited 
exceptions – and that the integrity of an absolute prohibition on the use of force requires that 
the UN Charter system be closed in nature (in the sense that the exception be tied to the 
prohibition).
100
  Of course, the UN Charter does admit breaches of a state’s territorial 
integrity that are not tied to its prior breach of Article 2(4) – in particular the Security Council 
can rely on Chapter VII powers to respond to a threat to the peace that is neither the result of 
a state’s breach of Article 2(4) nor, indeed, any internationally wrongful act at all.  But the 
breadth of the collective security exception need not (and should not) inform the breadth of 
the unilateral exception.  More importantly, even if the approach to Article 51 needs to ensure 
the complete or closed nature of the Charter system, that system must nevertheless be situated 
within and responsive to the broader international legal framework (which has moved well 
beyond the post WWII context of state-centricity and a rights-based conception of 
sovereignty).  
The pre-Charter understanding of self-defence suggests that it should be approached 
as an independent right, which operates on its own terms (in particular the requirement of an 
‘armed attack’), and this approach is not contradicted by the treatment of self-defence within 
the UN Charter travaux preparatoires.  But the logic of the UN Charter system as a whole, 
and overwhelming academic commentary, suggests that self-defence must be understood as a 
responsive right.  While this author has accepted the responsive nature of the right in prior 
writing,
101
 this article appreciates the case for characterising it as an independent right (an 
approach that need not affect the closed or complete nature of the UN Charter system, as will 
be explored below), and leaves open the issue of characterisation.  Instead, this section will 
explore each interpretive approach and the way in which it reflects the modern international 
legal system – in particular its increasing actor-pluralism and conceptions of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’ – via the now familiar doctrine of ‘unwilling or unable.’   
 
ii. Self-defence as an inherent and independent right akin to ‘necessity’ 
 
While the ILC (and Ago in particular) viewed self-defence as a responsive circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness (like a countermeasure), Ago understood well the concerns 
articulated in section I above regarding NSAs and their capacity to threaten human life from 
across borders.
102
  The reason these concerns did not steer Ago away from a responsive 
approach to Article 51 is that he left open the possibility, supported by pre-Charter state 
practice and opinio juris, that ‘necessity’ as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness might 
provide victim states with legal cover when they acted in breach of Article 2(4) (as long as 
their use of force did not rise to the level of the jus cogens prohibited aggression) to protect 
those subject to their jurisdiction from cross-border NSA violence.
103
  Ago summarised the 
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relevant state practice as follows:  
 
The common feature of these cases is, first of all, the existence of a grave and imminent 
danger to the State, to some of its nationals or simply to people, a danger of which the 
territory of the foreign State is either the theatre or the place of origin, and which the 
foreign State in question has a duty to avert by its own action but which its 
unwillingness or inability to act allows to continue. Another common feature is the 
limited character of the actions in question, in terms both of duration and of the means 
employed, in keeping with the purpose, which is restricted to eliminating the perceived 
danger.
104
  
 
Ago quite rightly expressed concern regarding the possibility that general international law 
might permit exceptions to the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force that are not 
contemplated by the Charter – not least because of the impact such admission would have on 
the integrity of the prohibition and the completeness of the UN Charter framework.
105
  
Nevertheless, Ago’s narrow, responsive and state-centric approach to Article 51 virtually 
demanded that he accept the Charter be open to general circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness (in the form of ‘necessity’), lest the UN Charter render states incapable of 
responding to existential threats to individuals subject to their jurisdiction.  Sharing Ago’s 
concerns with the integrity of the UN system,  the interpretation of Article 51 proposed below 
a) reflects state practice and the modern international legal context of actor-pluralism and 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’ within which the UN Charter operates; and b) draws 
inspiration from the ILC’s work on circumstances precluding wrongfulness; while remaining 
committed to an absolute prohibition on the use of force which admits only the one – Charter 
based – unilateral exception.        
 
(a) State practice and international legal context   
 
States invoking the right to use force in self-defence in response to cross-border armed 
attacks by NSAs have emphasised their right to protect the life and physical integrity of 
individuals subject to their jurisdiction.
106
  Furthermore, in setting out the legal basis for 
Article 51 measures in the context of armed attacks launched by NSAs, states have not relied 
on a characterisation of the host state’s conduct as a breach of Article 2(4)107 – suggesting 
that they do not consider such a breach to be a necessary element of the self-defence calculus, 
and implicitly rejecting a responsive reading of the jus ad bellum provisions of the UN 
Charter.  Such invocations reflect an understanding of Article 51 as an independent right, one 
which operates on its own terms (in particular, the requirement of an ‘armed attack’), and 
independently of Article 2(4).  This approach to Article 51 will perhaps be most important in 
the context of a host state that is unable to prevent its territory from being used as a base of 
NSA operations (because it does not have the capacity of doing so) and is politically not in a 
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position to accept any offers of assistance because those offers pose a greater threat to 
sovereignty than a foreign state’s targeted use of force against NSAs within its borders.  In 
such circumstances the host state would not be acting in breach of Article 2(4), and yet the 
threat posed by NSAs operating from its territory persists for the victim state.      
As an independent right, Article 51 is well situated within the context of a UN Charter 
which accommodates and addresses the plurality of actors that threaten international peace 
and security and conceptions of sovereignty as responsibility (particularly in its human rights 
guise imposing positive obligations on states to ensure respect for the right to life and 
physical integrity of those subject to their jurisdiction).  In particular, as an independent right, 
Article 51 responds to the threat posed by NSAs, in that it requires an ‘armed attack’ as its 
trigger, but without reference to the source of the armed attack (which source is otherwise 
restricted to states via one version of the responsive approach).  And as a right that is 
evaluated on its own terms, without reference to Article 2(4), Article 51 can also be 
interpreted consistently with conceptions of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ – states can meet 
their obligations to protect the rights to life and physical integrity of those subject to their 
jurisdiction with defensive force if necessary.     
 
(b) ‘Necessity’ and Article 51  
 
As an independent UN Charter right, self-defence would operate much in the same way as the 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness of necessity
108
 in the state responsibility context, 
albeit with additional conditions particular to the jus ad bellum context.  ‘Necessity’ as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness has several features that distinguish it from a 
responsive circumstance precluding wrongfulness (like countermeasures). The relevant 
measure (in breach of the measure-adopting state’s international obligations) need not be in 
response to an internationally wrongful act, as long as it is the only way to safeguard an 
essential interest (including ‘preserving the very existence of the state and its people in time 
of public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian population’).109   
These features of necessity are precisely what underlie the ‘unwilling or unable’ 
doctrine as it would apply to self-defence (as an independent right) in the modern 
international legal context.  The ‘essential interest’ at stake represents a legal obligation 
inherent in ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ – that is the victim (and measure adopting) state’s 
obligation to ‘ensure the safety of [its] civilian population.’  Furthermore, states can rely on 
self-defence as an independent right via the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine to justify measures 
adopted in an innocent third state’s territory (for instance in cases where the host state’s 
failure to prevent its territory from being used as a base of NSA armed attacks is not an 
internationally wrongful act owing to the exercise of due diligence, within its capacity).  This 
will be the case, however, only when the measure (defensive force) is necessary in order to 
respond to the grave and imminent peril to a local population – ‘unwilling or unable’ requires 
that defensive force be a last resort, or the ‘only way’ to respond to the relevant peril.110  
Finally, the peril against which the adopted measure is safeguarding has to be both 
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‘objectively established and not merely apprehended as possible’111 – and in the Article 51 
context, that peril must take the particular form of an ‘armed attack.’   
In exploring these features of ‘necessity’ as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, 
the Commentary to the ILC Articles on State Responsibility expressly considers the 1837 
Caroline incident – involving a use of force in a host state’s territory in response to attacks 
carried out by NSAs operating from that state.
112
  While the Caroline incident occurred long 
before international law absolutely prohibited the use of force in international relations, both 
Ago and Crawford, as endorsed by the ILC in its adoption of the Commentary, nevertheless 
suggest that it is relevant practice in respect of ‘necessity’ as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness.
113
   
This article accepts that the practice is relevant in evaluating the right to use force in a 
host state’s territory in response to un-attributable armed attacks by NSAs operating from that 
state – but not under the guise of ‘necessity’ in the state responsibility context.  There is no 
need and there are good policy reasons to avoid opening the Charter to customary 
international law circumstances precluding wrongfulness to accommodate this practice.  The 
right to use force in self-defence, read as an independent right evaluated on its own terms 
(which requires an ‘armed attack’ against a UN Member State tout court), more than 
accounts for the Caroline incident and similar subsequent practice.
114
  It does so, via the 
‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine, in a manner that is very much in keeping with the spirit of 
necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness – but remains committed to the UN 
Charter as a complete system.                 
 
iii. Self-defence as a responsive right  
 
As examined in the previous section, one way of responding to the threat to international 
peace and security (and, indeed, individual state’s security) posed by NSAs, which accounts 
for the shifts in international law discussed in sections II and III above, is to understand the 
right to use force in self-defence in response to cross-border attacks by NSAs as an 
independent right which operates on its own terms, not unlike ‘necessity’ in the state 
responsibility context.   
This said, academic commitment to a responsive reading of Article 51 remains strong, 
whether for the sake of symmetry or for the purposes of protecting the UN Charter 
framework as a complete (and closed) system.  Hitherto, the understanding of self-defence as 
a responsive right has been informed by an inter-state-rights based approach to the UN 
Charter.  But the view of the international legal order on which this understanding of the 
interaction between Articles 2(4) and 51 rests is one which no longer reflects positive law.  
This article has argued that the UN Charter is not as state-centric as this classical 
understanding of the interaction between Articles 2(4) and 51 might suggest, and that 
sovereignty is increasingly understood in terms of responsibility – including a state’s 
responsibility to protect those within its jurisdiction and to prevent its territory from being 
used as a base for activities that are harmful to human security across the border.  Even if the 
characterisation of Article 51 as a responsive right is accepted, post-Charter evolution of the 
international legal system calls for a new approach to the nature of the responsive interaction.  
In particular, accepting that both a prior breach of Article 2(4) by the host state, and an 
‘armed attack’ (in accordance with Article 51), are necessary conditions for the lawful use of 
defensive force under the responsive approach, then the modern international legal context of 
actor-pluralism and the ‘turn to responsibility’ within which the Charter operates suggests the 
disaggregation of these two conditions.  The prior breach of Article 2(4) and the armed attack 
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trigger for self-defence need not be co-extensive, in particular where the armed attack is 
launched by NSAs.
115
     
This reading of the interaction between Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter (i) 
focuses on the role of states in creating or maintaining the environment for international 
peace and security while nevertheless addressing a plurality of actors within the international 
legal order; and (ii) reflects that the signposts of sovereignty – territorial integrity and 
political independence – entail both rights and obligations (responsibilities).  In so doing, it 
dovetails precisely with the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine.  If a state is either unwilling to 
prevent its territory from being used as a base for NSAs, or unable to do so and unwilling to 
co-operate by accepting assistance (thereby ‘acquiescing’), it is acting in breach of Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.
116
  In keeping with the responsive approach to the interaction 
between Articles 2(4) and 51, a state that breaches Article 2(4) is not entitled to claim the 
protection of Article 2(4) – and its unwillingness or inability to prevent cross-border armed 
attacks by NSAs from its territories accounts for the necessity of a use of defensive force in 
response to those armed attacks.  The ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine as applied in a 
responsive self-defence context is also informed by the ‘turn to responsibility,’ particularly as 
regards the host state’s obligation to prevent external harm (failure in which constitutes its 
breach of Article 2(4)), and the victim state’s obligation to protect the life and physical 
integrity of those subject to its jurisdiction.  Indeed, in all cases where the doctrine has been 
relied on as a basis for the use of force in a host state’s territory (whether expressly or 
implicitly), in response to cross-border armed attacks by NSAs, the armed attacks were 
directed at the local population within the victim state’s territory.117    
          
iv. Strict conditions to which ‘unwilling or unable’ is subject 
 
However the right to use force in self-defence in response to armed attacks by NSAs is 
characterised, its exercise must be scrupulously compliant with the jus ad bellum restrictions 
of necessity (inherent in the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine) and proportionality, international 
humanitarian law protections of civilian populations and, if applicable, human rights 
protection of the right to life and physical integrity.
118
  Operations that have as their aim the 
protection of innocent life on one side of the border should not sacrifice innocent life on the 
other side.
119
  Nevertheless, and assuming an exercise of self-defence in the host state’s 
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territory amounts to an exercise of jurisdiction triggering human rights obligations,
120
 it is not 
a breach of the right to life to harm or even kill those who pose a mortal danger to others, 
provided the action is necessary to protect prospective victims.
121
  The fact that there is a 
border between NSAs posing an existential threat, and prospective victims, does not change 
that human rights calculus.        
 
V. Conclusions and policy considerations  
 
This article has argued that the right to use force in self-defence in a foreign host state’s 
territory, in response to un-attributable armed attacks by NSAs operating from the host 
State’s territory, is not merely established as a matter of state practice122 – it should also be 
understood as an instantiation of broader shifts in the international legal system.  These shifts, 
most particularly as regards the increasing actor-pluralism of the international legal order 
generally and the UN Charter in particular, and the ‘turn to responsibility’ in sovereignty 
terms, are reflected in the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine as it informs the exercise of the right 
of self-defence under Article 51.  None of this is to say, however, that ‘unwilling or unable’ 
in the self-defence context is without controversy.
123
   
Concerns remain as to the practical application of the doctrine.  For instance, its 
successful application relies on the victim state’s determination of the host state’s capacity to 
prevent its territory from being used as a base of NSA operations.  While a state’s capacity to 
exercise control within its territory is, as argued in section III.iii above, a legitimate matter of 
international concern within the modern legal context of actor-pluralism and the ‘turn to 
responsibility’ – the dangers of auto-determination, well-rehearsed in other international legal 
contexts,
124
 are particularly troublesome in regard to the jus ad bellum.  These dangers, 
however, are already accepted on an inter-state reading of Article 51.  They call for careful 
attention to the conditions for the applicability of the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine125 and a 
concerted effort by the international community to invoke the responsibility of those states 
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which rely on the doctrine in ‘ritual incantation’126 – without legal basis.  That said, as with 
‘necessity’ as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, concerns regarding the potential for 
abuse are not a sound basis for rejecting a doctrine which has support in state practice and is 
consistent (or even required) by the modern context within which the UN Charter operates.
127
          
It also bears contemplating the consequences of strict adherence to an inter-state-
rights based conception of the jus ad bellum – one which fails to respond to the increasingly 
dangerous capabilities of NSAs.  Without ‘unwilling or unable’ as a feature of the UN 
Charter landscape, states are unable to protect individuals subject to their jurisdiction against 
cross-border armed attacks by NSAs.  The result of such restrictions is not that states will sit 
idly by while their inhabitants are attacked.  The result of such restrictions is that states will 
increasingly ignore the UN Charter framework – and that framework can only withstand so 
much before it breaks and descends into irrelevance.
128
  An adaptive approach to the jus ad 
bellum, one which accounts for actor-pluralism and the ‘turn to responsibility’ as argued for 
in this article, ensures the continued relevance and viability of the UN Charter as the 
constitution of the international legal order.        
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